Introduction

Can the same forces that seem to threaten democracy also be those that save it?

Populism, broadly understood as a political style opposing ‘the pure people’ to ‘the corrupt elite’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017), is a defining characteristic of contemporary politics, but its impact is controversial; A consequence of its dual nature as both a threat to democracy and a form of it. This essay concentrates on the United Kingdom, where populism is transforming debate within a traditionally stable parliamentary democracy and may even be leading to a realigned political landscape. It questions whether populism in the UK is a real danger to democracy or a mechanism to renew it, by giving a voice to marginalised citizens.

To address this question, the essay combines philosophical debate about populism’s democratic credentials with empirical consideration of recent British politics post-2016, first-past-the-post distortions, party fragmentation, and constitutional strains.

The essay contends that populism is a paradox: it marginalises voters by not translating their votes into key decisions, entrenching polarisation but simultaneously legitimises democracy by re-engaging citizens and calling for reform.

What is Populism?

Populism is literally defined a political strategy that seeks to appeal to common people who believe their interests are neglected by entrenched elite groups (Oxford Languages Dictionary). Although, populism is among the most disputed terms in political science, characterised both as a corrective to democracy as well as a danger to liberal institutions. At its most fundamental level, it appeals to “the people” in opposition to entrenched elites (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).

Despite ideological differences, populism is united by its moral claim to represent “the people” versus “the corrupt elite.” Its origins trace back to Rousseau’s The Social Contract (1762), in which political legitimacy is based on the sovereign general will of the people. Populists appeal to this lineage to portray themselves as genuine representatives of the general will in opposition to aloof elites (Laclau, 2005). Populism also critiques elitism: left-wing variants target economic elites, while right-wing populism criticizes political and cultural elites who are blamed for eroding national traditions (Taggart, 2000). Though the perspective that populism’s core is a rejection of pluralism. This insinuates populists are inherently anti-democratic because they claim exclusive representation of “the people,” if populism have enough power, they will create an authoritarian state that excludes all those not considered part of the proper “people” (Muller, 2016). Populist discourse is morally contentious, casting politics as a battle between virtuous, homogenous citizens and a corrupt elite (Mény & Surel, 2002). Central ethical arguments include fairness and equality, anti-corruption, and the construction of an ethical community (Panizza, 2005). However, such moral absolutism can conflict with liberal democracy, which relies on pluralism, institutional checks, and minority protections. Populist leaders often regard these protections as obstacles to the people’s will, bypassing them and weakening institutions (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Urbinati, 2019). Populism, then, both embraces popular sovereignty and undermines the liberal foundations of democratic stability.

Contemporary UK Politics

In the UK, populism is strongest in the political party Reform UK, the successor to the Brexit Party. It frames politics as a struggle between “ordinary people” and the “Westminster elite,” leveraging disproportional results under first-past-the-post, like securing 14.3 per cent of the 2024 vote yet just five seats, as evidence the system is “rigged” (House of Commons Library, 2024).

UK populism is driven by institutional distrust. The government is trusted by only 27 per cent of citizens, with Parliament (24 per cent) and parties (12 per cent) at the bottom (OECD, 2024). Distrust of MPs rose from 54 per cent in 2014 to 76 per cent in 2024 (Parliament POST, 2025), offering fertile ground for anti-establishment appeals. Furthermore, Nigel Farage’s “charismatic” leadership which values authenticity, enemy-making, and unmediated communication via GB News, rallies, and social media, bypasses mainstream institutions and frames him as the “voice of the people” (Moffitt, 2016; Bobba & McDonnell, 2016). This leads to By engaging disillusioned voters, voter turnout increases, leading to a more “legitimate” democracy, though the use of alternate means could ratify fewer formal checks and balances on democratic systems.

Reform UK also feeds on crisis narratives, particularly around immigration and cultural transformation, framing them as existential threats rather than policy debates. This “backlash morality” portrays elites as betraying sovereignty and Reform as its guardian (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). International focus on the anti-immigration rhetoric had entered mainstream national media by 2025, further boosting Reform’s populist appeal (The Guardian, 2025). This demonstrates the paradox of populism: it mobilises disillusioned citizens and encourages participation, yet risks destabilising liberal norms by amplifying polarisation.

What is Democracy?

Democracy is defined diversely in political science. Procedural definitions emphasise elections as mechanisms of accountability (Schmitter & Karl, 1991), while institutional-liberal perspectives highlight guarantees of civil and political rights (Beetham, 2004). This highlights the ability to scrutinise the executive, through methods such as PMQs, petitions or protest.

Accountability-centred perspectives, stress elections as the main means for citizens to sanction the governing party. Following Churchill, democracy has traditionally been argued to be the “least-bad” system: imperfect but better than authoritarian options because of its ability for self-correction, pluralism, and safeguard against concentrated power.

These definitions indicate different thresholds at which populism may be corrective or threatening. If democracy is merely elections, populism’s mobilisation of “the people” may be healthy. If democracy also relies on liberal checks and pluralist institutions, populism’s antagonism to elites may erode democratic stability.

Democracy also functions as a moral and ethical exercise of recognising citizens as independent, politically valid agents, reinforcing the rule of law, one of the key twin pillars of the UK’s constitution. Instrumentally, it allows rotation of power and reduces disputes by enabling citizens to sanction governments. The use of open debate, pluralism, and free media allow society to prevent policy errors and facilitate democracy (Sen, 1999; Beetham, 2004; Dahl, 1989). Though, populism tests democracy: it can increase participation and accountability while simultaneously threatening pluralism and institutional resilience.

UK Democracy in Context

The UK exemplifies these principles, it is a constitutional monarchy, with sovereignty vested in Parliament and the executive and legislature in the Commons under the Westminster system (Walters, 2022; Flinders et al., 2021).

UK parliamentary elections are held under first-past-the-post (FPTP), which structures party strategy, voter incentives, and electoral outcomes (Kavanagh & Cowley, 2015) but is known for its consolidation of the two-party system. The UK also consists of devolved legislatures – the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Senedd, and Northern Ireland Assembly. They operate proportional or mixed voting systems, generating alternative party dynamics and governance outcomes.

UK democracy is presently characterized by political turbulence, institutional pressure, and participation shortfalls. Brexit-era disputes further strained constitutional conventions and tested the ability of institutions to accommodate political disagreement followed by the cost-of-living crisis, austerity, institutional scandals and misinformation.

These pressures reveal that democracy is contested. The UK’s institutions are at a critical point in time, in the wake of a new era of politics. With the rise of Reform UK, the way in which it operates simultaneously signals democratic vitality through mobilisation. Voters who did not previously engage with the political system have now been placed as candidates within elections. Though this potentially causes democratic erosion by challenging norms and checks.

What is a Threat to Democracy?

A threat to democracy occurs when fundamental institutions including but not limited to competitive elections, pluralism, civil liberties, rule of law, and minority protection, are undermined (Merkel, 2004; Diamond, 1999). Often, threats are of internal origin: elected actors themselves are the principal factors in eroding the norms (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).

A key exemplification of this are populist leaders, such as El Salvador under the Bukele administration. Due to his anti-establishment populist perceptions, the institutional stability of the state is being eroded, and the country’s constitution is manipulated to perpetuate those in power. International human rights organizations and democracy watchdogs consistently report that Bukele’s administration has systematically dismantled democratic institutions and concentrated power in the executive branch and overwhelmingly condemn his actions, arguing they pose a severe threat to democracy.

This indicates that populism’s effects cannot be confined to mobilising and re-engaging previously disillusioned constituents, considering that it could cause wide scale systemic reforms to the UK’s democracy. By foregrounding neglected issues, populism could force significant reforms from constituents. This is again most clearly indicated in the 2024 general election, where Reform UK received 14.3% of the vote (which debatably ushered in a new era of a multi-party system rather than a two party one). This establishes that either populism is eroding procedural fairness in democracy as our traditional system is being forcefully shifted (Beetham, 2004) or that the UK’s institutions are faulted in the manner it treats views of the minority.

This further demonstrates that populism can shape the UK’s political system to adapt to the preferences of previously marginalised voters. For example, the populist stances and arguments presented during the Brexit referendum accelerated the disintegration of existing democratic norms, exposed and exacerbated existing weaknesses, leading to political crises, increased polarisation, and challenges to constitutional norms. This indicates how populist leaders can influence UK voters, increase political apathy and diminish political trust. Moreover, when considering Britain’s participation crisis, characterised with declining party membership, thin trust and skewed turnout, populist mobilisation can redirect discontent into electoral channels (Whiteley, 2011; Stoker & Hay, 2017). The Brexit referendum shows both effects: increased participation but heightened polarisation (Hobolt, 2016). However, the extent to which there was increased sustained participation is questionable.

Alternatively, after the Brexit referendum, the presence of minor parties, specifically UKIP, had decreased significantly, this was followed by the 2024 general election with a mere 60% voter turnout.

This could indicate that the effects of populism are temporary and superficial, rather than having the potential to reform democracy it increases distrust in institutions and can spread misinformation in the long term, even if there is temporary mobilisation. This is seen in the Brexit referendum where data now indicates that 55% of Britons now say it was wrong for the UK to leave the EU, with just 11% seeing Brexit as more of a success than a failure (YouGov, 2025). Populism’s dual nature and instability, therefore, is reflected in the UK.

Conclusion

Hence, is populism a danger to democracy, or a form of it?

This essay argues that populism is a contradiction: it disrupts elite rule to potentially stabilise democracy through engagement with the institutions it critiques. Reform UK exemplifies this duality, condemning elites while participating in elections.

Populism is in some ways a threat to some elements of democracy but is fundamentally a form of it. In fact, whilst it challenges liberal checks and balances and risks entrenching polarisation, it simultaneously legitimises democracy. By drawing ignored voices into politics, populism can enhance responsiveness and civic engagement, yet it risks eroding pluralism and weakening checks. In short, populism menaces and rejuvenates democracy simultaneously, as a critique and stabiliser in the short term. Its impact is contingent on political context and institutional resilience and acts as an interim cure in politics. This can indicate that rather than being corrective it is simply a pressure valve that could hinder the ability to recognise and repair deeper systemic issues.

Furthermore, this duality raises questions: the research indicates that populism may be a symptom of democratic failures, such as the first past the post system, therefore can these same “flawed” institutions maintain legitimacy without relying on populist disruption? As populism is an inevitability, how would a centuries old institution removes the negative impacts of a key factor in its existence?

Future research must assess not only short-term impacts on factors such as trust and participation but also populism’s long-term ability to transform or entrench the UK’s democratic foundations.

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